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Approaches to Displaying Information to Assist Decisions 
under Uncertainty 
M.E. Kreye*, Y.M. Goh†, L.B. Newnes‡, P. Goodwin§ 
Abstract 
The estimation of the costs of a product or project and the decisions based on these forecasts are 
subject to much uncertainty relating to factors like unknown future developments. This has been 
addressed repeatedly in research studies focusing on different aspects of uncertainty; unfortunately, 
this interest has not yet been adopted in practice. One reason can be found in the inadequate 
representation of uncertainty. This paper introduces an experiment which engages different 
approaches to displaying cost forecasting information to gauge the consideration of uncertainty in 
the subsequent decision-making process. Three different approaches of displaying cost-forecasting 
information including the uncertainty involved in the data were tested, namely a three point trend 
forecast, a bar chart and a FAN-diagram. Furthermore, the effects of using different levels of 
contextual information about the decision problem were examined. The results show that decision 
makers tend to simplify the level of uncertainty from a possible range of future outcomes to the 
limited form of a point estimate. Furthermore, the contextual information made the participants 
more aware of uncertainty. In addition, the fan-diagram prompted 75.0% of the participants to 
consider uncertainty even if they had not used this type of diagram before; it was therefore 
identified as the most suitable method of graphical information display for encouraging decision 
makers to consider the uncertainty in cost forecasting. 
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1. Introduction 
Uncertainty influences most business decisions [1], shapes the way people interact with each other 
[2], exists in the material properties of physical systems [3], and is directly related to the 
performance of a product [4]. Because of its importance it has been the focus of research in a range 
of areas such as design, economics [5-7], and particularly cost estimation and forecasting [8-10]. 
Estimating costs, especially in the early design phases, involves uncertainty about possible future 
developments and decisions. The importance of considering uncertainty in these areas has been 
highlighted by researchers and approaches for modelling and treating it have been developed [11-
14]. 
However, the practical adoption of the management of uncertainty does not reflect this research 
development [2]. Discussions with industry-based cost estimation experts during conferences and 
other venues have shown that the consideration of uncertainty is underrepresented in industry, 
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especially where decisions have to be made [15]. Even when uncertainty is considered in the 
information-capturing process it is rarely included in the final decision [16-18]. Given a distribution 
of possible outcome scenarios, decision makers tend to choose the average or simply the most likely 
value which often results in an overconfident and inaccurate decision [1]. One of the main reasons 
for this neglect is the inadequate representation of uncertainty in the information supplied to 
decision makers. A clear representation of input information is essential to support an informed 
decision [18-20]. This suggests that an adequate representation of the uncertainty associated with 
the data and the future outcome of a decision will enhance the consideration of uncertainty in 
decision making. 
This paper describes how the decision maker understands and interprets the uncertainty included in 
a cost forecast and how this interpretation changes with different ways of representing the 
information. An experiment is introduced which tested the effects of differently displayed 
representations of the uncertainty on the decision maker’s understanding of the problem. The state 
of the art in uncertainty research is described in Section 2. 
2. Uncertainty in research 
Many authors have suggested that there is a difference between risk and uncertainty [21, 22], but, 
different definitions and classifications of risk and uncertainty can be found in literature [13, 14, 23-
25]. Nevertheless, the terms uncertainty and risk are still used interchangeably to describe similar 
problems in practice. The definitions applied to the research presented in this paper are as follows. 
Uncertainty is defined as something that is not definite, not known or not reliable which results in a 
potential deficiency in any phase or activity of the process [26, 27]. This means that some relevant 
information about the outcome of a process or a decision in the future is not known or knowable 
[2]. Risk can be defined as the possible impact or outcome of this uncertain situation or problem 
[28]. This research focuses on uncertainty and, thus, does not discuss risk in any more detail. 
Describing uncertainty research, a distinction has to be made between the general concept of 
uncertainty in its nominal existence in a situation and the concept that is connected to a person in 
the sense of making him/her feel unsure or unconfident. A particular situation can have an inherent 
uncertainty, for example the costs of a particular material cannot be forecasted exactly but only as 
an interval. In contrast, a decision maker facing this uncertainty may feel very confident about 
basing his/her decision on a specific cost value depending on e.g. his/her experience. The presented 
research comprehends uncertainty as an independent concept and aims at the decision maker’s 
accurate understanding and interpretation of this uncertainty. 
Uncertainty can be categorised as quantitative and qualitative by expression. Quantitative describes 
the uncertainties that can be measured e.g. in numbers [25]. It has been the topic of many research 
papers over the decades especially in the area of modelling uncertainty using probability theory [29-
32]. Qualitative uncertainties have largely been unaddressed in past research [13, 25]; and, given 
their nature, are mostly associated with the societal aspect of a problem such as the framing of the 
problem, model structures, system boundaries, and judgement [33]. Uncertainty modelling in cost 
estimation usually deals with quantitative uncertainty or numbers that have been allocated to 
qualitative uncertainty [34-36]. The uncertainty is typically included in the cost forecast as a range 
of possible outcomes. Using number allocation, numbers (or intervals) are allocated to the 
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qualitative uncertainties and then included in the cost model [37]. For example in fuzzy set theory, a 
value is allocated to qualitative information according to its affiliation to a membership function 
[38-40]. These uncertainties can be considered and included in a cost forecast and a cost forecast 
display. 
One important research area is the perception and interpretation of the uncertainty included in the 
cost forecast. Psychology research has investigated how people experience the existence of 
uncertainty and how they react. Two different reactions were identified: for some, the situation was 
overwhelming and they felt paralysed, for others, the situation encouraged them and they found new 
solutions and answers [41]. The researchers concluded that the difference was created by the 
perception of “controlling” the uncertainty. When a situation offers a high level of control, 
individuals can feel more intrinsic motivation and show more initiative caused by the experience of 
psychological factors such as greater interest, less pressure, more creativity, and a higher self-
esteem [42, 43]. If a situation offers a low level of control, these positive outcomes are less likely to 
occur [44]. These reactions are very subjective and depend on the characteristics and experience of 
the specific person [45]. 
Decision makers tend to ignore uncertainty and in particular, they tend to avoid the possible 
negative impact of uncertainty [46, 47]. Their reactions to the possibilities of regret and 
disappointment have been discussed in this context [48-51]. Other reactions that can be observed, 
particularly after the outcome of a decision problem has become reality, include the invention of a 
“higher rationale” to explain uncertain events and so treat them as if they involved the skills of the 
decision maker and, therefore, seem influenceable and controllable [46, 52, 53]. Experiments in this 
area have been described as the throwing of dice where the gamblers were observed to throw the 
dice with greater force in order to throw a higher number [52], the prediction of coin tosses where 
students perceived themselves as “better than the average” predictors of outcomes when they made 
correct predictions at the beginning of the experiment [54], and the winning of a lottery where the 
participants assigned higher confidence in having the winning lottery ticket when they had chosen 
the ticket themselves as opposed to receiving a randomly allocated one [46, p. 257]. 
If decision makers do acknowledge the presence of uncertainty in the decision process, for example 
via a forecast range, they tend to underestimate it, or in other words, they overestimate the 
probability that the range will include the true outcome [55, 56]. A so-called surprise index 
indicates what percentage of true values out of a number of given estimates fall outside the range 
expressed by the tested person. For example, for a 90% confidence interval this percentage should 
be 10%. If the observed percentage exceeds this value, the individual is overconfident. In contrast, 
if less than 10% of outcomes occur outside the interval this would indicate that the person is 
underconfident (i.e. their interval is too wide). Many studies which have investigated the assessment 
of uncertain parameters have found that forecasters tend to be overconfident [55, 57-60]. Even after 
the tested participants were confronted with their overconfidence and asked to give a new estimate, 
they improved but were still considerably overconfident [57, 61, 62]. Different explanations for 
these phenomena have been found. However, the one of which has received the most attention is the 
idea that decision makers use an “anchor-and-adjust” heuristic for estimating a range of possible 
values [63, 64]. That means that they use their belief of the most likely value as an anchor and set 
the boundaries of the range or interval by adjusting away from that value. Within this procedure, 
they make too small an adjustment from the anchor and hence of the range width is too small [55, 
63-65]. 
Nevertheless, some studies have found that, under some circumstances uncertainty is overestimated 
[63, 66-68]. For example, in a study by Bolger and Harvey [66], decision makers were asked to 
estimate the probability of the future value in a time-series being below a given reference point and 
compared the answers to the true probabilities. The study found that the probabilities of less than 
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50% were overestimated and those of more than 50% were underestimated. Similarly, Diebold et al. 
[67] found that forecasters overestimated the probability of the future value of inflation falling 
below a stated point forecast. Both research studies involved the estimation of uncertainty relative 
to a reference point which suggests that uncertainty assessment is sensitive to the methods used to 
obtain the estimates. 
This sensitivity suggests that well calibrated prediction intervals might be obtained by distributing 
the forecasting problem to two experts. One would be asked to give a range within which the future 
value is supposed to fall and the other would then be asked to estimate a probability value for this 
range [63]. However, this is clearly not an option when, only one person is responsible for an entire 
decision. 
In the case of overconfident decision makers, contradictory evidence has been found on the 
influence of additional information or knowledge on the estimation of uncertainty. Pickard and 
Wallace [62] tested the influence of training on the overconfidence of the decision makers by giving 
them immediate feedback throughout five and six sessions of forecasting for the same problem. The 
results showed a moderate improvement (a 37.5% reduction of the surprise index for five sessions 
and a 47.8% reduction of the surprise index for six sessions) but there still remained a high level of 
overconfidence. O'Connor and Lawrence [59] revealed that the provision of feedback to people on 
the accuracy of their forecasts improved the calibration of future confidence intervals considerably, 
especially when a confidence interval of 75% was requested. Other studies, on the other hand, show 
contradictory evidence. Brown [69] studied the effect of additional information in the form of 
extensive historical data while Lichtenstein and Fischhoff [70] studied the impact of calibration 
training on the surprise index of forecasters. Both results show no improvement in the estimation of 
uncertainty. 
The uncertainty connected to an event or the outcome of a decision can be assessed through a 
subjective probabilities which typically represent degrees of belief [71]. This expresses the decision 
maker’s (subjective) belief about the likelihood of an uncertain event happening or of an uncertain 
outcome of a process [72]. This belief can be expressed in a number of ways including the use of 
phrases such as “It is likely that” or “Highly improbable that” which may be ambiguous [73]. This 
belief function is affected by a number of influences such as the biases of the decision maker or the 
decision maker’s experience which can lead to over or underestimation of the probability of the 
outcome. These subjective probabilities cannot usually be judged as “right” or “wrong” [55, 71]; 
they can be judged, however, on their level of realism (e.g. see Lichtenstein et al. [55]). In the 
experiment that is described in Section 3, the subjective beliefs in the likelihood of propositions are 
represented as confidence levels. 
When the assessment of a forecasting problem is dependent on the judgement of the decision 
maker, it is subjective which means that it is likely to be biased and inconsistent [63]. Examples of 
biases include the underestimation of trends or the over influence of recent events [74, 75]. Recent 
events can cause the probability of a forthcoming similar event to be either over or underestimated. 
Overestimation can result from the use of the availability heuristic [76]. This was observed in the 
context of earthquake insurances in California after the earthquake in 1989, when the number of 
sold policies increased significantly [77]. Underestimation can result from the gambler’s fallacy 
[76]. 
The general ignorance of uncertainty in the decision process and the biases associated with this can 
lead to a misinterpretation of situations and wrong decisions [47, 78, 79]. However, the 
consideration of uncertainty in cost estimation and forecasting has not yet been addressed. One 
major aspect in the cost estimation and forecasting process is the collection and interpretation of 
relevant information. Graphical displays of this information are common and can be seen as an 
important communication channel to improve a decision maker’s comprehension of the problem at 
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hand [19, 20, 74]. However, different graphs displaying the same information point the viewer 
towards different aspects of the information [80]. Therefore, displaying uncertain forecasts in 
different ways is likely to change the decision maker’s perception of the information and so 
influence which aspects are included in the decision process. Section 3 introduces an experiment 
that was designed to test the relative effectiveness of different approaches to displaying cost 
forecasting information in terms of their ability to encourage decision makers to consider 
uncertainty in their decisions. 
3. Including uncertainty in decisions – a practical analysis 
The experiment presented in this paper was constructed to test how the decision maker understands 
and interprets the uncertainty included in a cost forecast. Earlier, the influence of the subjective 
judgement of the decision maker was highlighted as being influential on the forecasting [81-83]. 
For this experiment the three key types of judgement identified were investigated. These were the 
use of judgement: 
• to extrapolate information on past series into the future, 
• to adjust statistical time series extrapolations, and 
• to integrate both time series and contextual information [81] to produce a cost forecast. 
 
To investigate the decisions taken, it was necessary to identify the types of information typically 
available in a forecasting process. This includes time series information, labels and contextual 
information. Time series represent past information recorded at different points in time, such as the 
past development costs of a product. Labels are the representations of the variable that is being 
forecast, for example the vertical axis of a graph may be labelled as ‘monthly costs, $’. Contextual 
information gives further background on the estimation problem. For example, it may contain 
details of special circumstances that may cause a trend in costs to be disturbed. 
3.1 Aim of the experiment 
Presenting information in a graphical display can result in an improved understanding of data 
compared with using only textual or tabular information [19, 20, 63, 80, 84]. In the light of these 
findings the experiment focused on analysing people’s propensity to consider uncertainty as a result 
of seeing different graphical displays. The overall aim of the experiment was to ascertain the most 
appropriate way of displaying the uncertainty involved in a forecasting problem. The two research 
questions investigated were; 
1) What type of graphical display is required to assist the decision maker in considering 
uncertainty? 
2) How much contextual information is required to represent uncertainty in the decision-
making process? 
An experiment was used to address these questions. 
3.2 Experiment procedure 
The experiment was carried out at a one day conference on “Cost Estimating for Defence 
Programmes” organised by the Society for Cost Analysis and Forecasting (SCAF) which was 
attended by costing experts from the aerospace and defence sectors. The experiment consisted of 
two questionnaires, each included a set of questions which were presented in a predetermined order 
[85]. To reduce the likelihood of the participants remembering what they selected in questionnaire 
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1, questionnaire 2 was completed after a defined time difference. The first questionnaire was 
handed out and collected early in the morning at the conference and the second one in the afternoon. 
In order to test different ways of displaying information, the participants were divided into three 
groups A, B, and C. The affiliation to a certain group was allocated randomly. The participants 
stayed in their groups throughout the whole experiment so somebody who answered questionnaire 1 
from group A would also answer questionnaire 2 for that group. For each of the groups, different 
graphical displays were used to represent the forecasts as shown in Figure 1. These graphical 
displays were; 
• a three point trend forecast for group A, 
• a bar chart with minimum, medium and maximum estimates for group B, and 
• a fan diagram for group C. 
 
Each of the graphs displayed past data on the monthly cost of a raw material from January 1990 to 
January 2009, together with the forecasts. It consisted of the same information and labels providing 
a forecast scenario with minimum, medium and maximum values. The cost data was artificially 
generated so that the observations were distributed randomly around a linear upward, ‘flat’ or 
downward trend. 
 
Figure 1: Graphical display of the forecasting problem 
 
Both questionnaires contained the same forecasting scenario and contained six questions. 
• First, participants were asked to give an estimate of the future costs of the raw material for the 
year 2014 (January), based on the information given. The choice of giving a point or interval 
estimate was left to the participants. 
• Then, they were requested to give the reasons for their answer; this was phrased as an open 
question. 
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• Finally, they were asked to provide the confidence level for their estimate. Six discrete intervals 
were given between which the participants could choose. Those were 0-20%, 21-40%, 41-50%, 
51-60%, 61-80%, and 81-100%. It should be noted that a statement of confidence in relation to 
a point forecast of a continuous variable is ambiguous since the theoretical probability that the 
forecast will equal the outcome is zero. However, this question gave an insight on the extent to 
which people are prepared to make such ambiguous statements when estimating future values of 
an uncertain variable. 
 
The same questions were asked in order to obtain an estimate of costs for 2018 (Questionnaire 2). 
The two questionnaires differed in the amount of information that was supplied: 
• Questionnaire 1 only gave some general information on the forecasting problem and a graph 
with the historical and estimated future prices of the raw material. 
• Questionnaire 2 included more detailed information relating to the forecast, e.g. what the 
different values meant and the assumptions that underpinned the forecasts. The additional 
information focused on the background of the graphical information. It was kept to a basic level 
as people are constrained in the amount of information they can consider and process in a 
decision making process [86-88]. 
 
The next section describes the participants and their characteristics. 
3.3 Participants 
The participants were cost engineers from industry part-taking in a cost estimation workshop 
organised by the Society for Cost Analysis and Forecasting (SCAF). Forty-four experts (out of 52 
attendees at the conference) participated in the experiment of which 13 were assigned to group A, 
15 to B and 16 to C. 75% of participants stated that they had worked before with a diagram of the 
same type that was presented to them in the experiment and 40% said they had used it in cost 
estimation, albeit with differing frequencies. Of the people who had used that type of graph in their 
work, 13% stated that they used it once a week, 27% once a month, 20% once every other month, 
20% once a year and 20% used it only occasionally. Table 1 summarises the results per group in 
terms of familiarity with the diagram in the questionnaire and whether they had used the type of 
diagram in their work. The table shows both the absolute number of participants and the percentage. 
For groups A and C, these percentages do not add up to 100% because two participants in each 
group did not reply to these questions. 
The results show that the participants of group A (who were presented with the three point graph) 
had the highest level of familiarity with the graph they were given and also the highest level of 
experience of working with this type of graph. Those in group C (who were presented with a fan 
chart) had the lowest levels of familiarity and experience with the graph they were given. The 
assignment of participants to the groups was as follows: 
• Group A: 13 participants (10 experienced), 
• Group B: 15 participants (12 experienced), 
• Group C: 16 participants (9 experienced). 
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Table 1: Participants’ experience with diagram according to the groups 
Question Group A Group B Group C 
Yes No 
Y/N-
Ratio 
Yes No 
Y/N-
Ratio 
Yes No 
Y/N-
Ratio 
Have you seen a 
diagram like this 
before? 
10* 
76.9% 
1* 
7.7% 
10.0 
12 
80.0 % 
3 
20.0 % 
4 
9* 
56.3 % 
5* 
31.2 % 
1.8 
Do you use this type of 
diagram in your work? 
7* 
53.9 % 
4* 
30.8 % 
1.75 
5 
33.3 % 
10 
66.7 % 
0.5 
4* 
25.0 % 
10* 
62.5 % 
0.4 
* these figures do not sum to 100% because one participant failed to supply a forecast 
 
This categorisation of the participants is maintained throughout the analysis of the results. 
4. Results 
In this section, the results of the experiment are analysed and explained in terms of the contextual 
information, the type of diagram used to display the information and the reasons given for selection 
of the estimate. 
4.1 Cost forecasts 
A first indication of the participants’ understanding of uncertainty can be found in the kind of 
forecast that was elicited from them. If a range of possible outcomes was given, it was assumed that 
the decision maker was aware of the uncertainty connected to the cost forecasts. The following 
responses were interpreted as range forecasts: i) a three point forecast, ii) a range between a 
minimum and a maximum value and iii) uncertainty included in a narrative way, e.g. “around £700” 
or “approximately £700”. Table 2 shows the results for all the participants with those for the 
experienced subset of participants in brackets. 
The results for the whole set of participants show no significant difference between the groups 
(p<0.05). However, for the experienced participants, a difference can be observed for group C 
questionnaire 2. In this group, a range forecast was more usual than in the other two groups. This 
can be interpreted as the increased awareness of uncertainty that is caused by the fan diagram in 
combination with further contextual information. As stated, these results may provide an indication 
of the reduced level of confidence provided by the participants in this group. 
For all three groups, some forecasts stated as a range in 2014 were reduced to a point forecast in 
2018. In general, an event further into the future will be subject to more uncertainty which means 
that the range estimate for 2014 should change to an even larger range in 2018. The difference 
between the theoretical explanation and the practical observation can possibly be explained with the 
subjective perception that an event which is a long way into can be perceived as less uncertain 
because disturbances caused by short term incidents will not spread as far as that.  
The forecasts produced by the participants were assigned to one of five categories ranging from low 
to high based on their position in the graphical display. Figure 2 shows the percentage of forecasts 
in each category for both the 2014 and 2018 forecasts made in response to questionnaires 1 and 2. If 
a range forecast was given, it was classified as either “low < medium” or “medium < high” 
depending on which side of the graph it was taken from. There were no significant differences in 
the forecasts produced by those who were experienced in using the type of graph supplied and those 
who were not experienced. Thus, Figure 2 displays forecasts for the whole set of participants. 
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Table 2: Summary of given answers for each group and each questionnaire 
 Questionnaire 1 2 
Year 2014 2018 2014 2018 
Group A 
range forecast 
quoted 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
point forecast 
quoted 
92.3% 
(90.0%) 
92.3% 
(90.0%) 
100% 
(100%) 
100% 
(100%) 
Group B 
range forecast 
quoted 
20.0% 
(25.0%) 
7.1% 
(8.3%) 
7.1% 
(8.3%) 
0 
(0) 
point forecast 
quoted 
80.0% 
(75.0%) 
92.9% 
(91.7%) 
92.9% 
(91.7%) 
100% 
(100%) 
Group C 
range forecast 
quoted 
25.0%* 
(33.3%) 
12.5* 
(22.2%) 
25.0% 
(33.3%) 
25.0% 
(33.3%) 
point forecast 
quoted 
68.8%* 
(66.7%) 
81.3%* 
(77.8%) 
75.0%  
(66.7%) 
75.0%  
(66.7%) 
* these figures do not sum to 100% because one participant failed to supply a forecast 
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Figure 2: Forecasting values by each group in comparison 
 
Table 3 shows the frequency of answers as the absolute value and the percentage for the all the 
participants and for the experienced participants in brackets. 
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Table 3: Forecasting values by group in comparison between whole set and experienced subset of participants 
 Year 2014 2018 
Questionnaire 1 2 1 2 
Group A
*
 
Low 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
Low < medium 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
30.8% 
(30.0%) 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
30.8% 
(20.0%) 
Medium 
46.1% 
(50.0%) 
30.8% 
(30.0%) 
30.8% 
(30.0%) 
38.5% 
(40.0%) 
Medium < 
high 
30.8% 
(20.0%) 
15.4% 
(10.0%)) 
46.1% 
(40.0%) 
15.4% 
(20.0%) 
High 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
15.4% 
(20.0%) 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
Group B 
Low 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
Low < medium 
6.7% 
(0) 
6.7% 
(8.3%) 
6.7% 
(0) 
13.3% 
(16.7%) 
Medium 
40.0% 
(41.7%) 
33.3% 
(25.0%) 
40.0% 
(41.7%) 
26.7% 
(25.0%) 
Medium < 
high 
46.7% 
(50.0%) 
53.3% 
(58.3%) 
46.7% 
(50.0%) 
53.3% 
(50.0%) 
High 
6.7% 
(8.3%) 
6.7% 
(8.3%) 
6.7% 
(8.3%) 
6.7% 
(8.3%) 
Group C
†
 
Low 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
Low < medium 
6.2% 
(0) 
18.8% 
(22.2%) 
6.2% 
(0) 
18.8% 
(11.1%) 
Medium 
50.0% 
(55.5%) 
31.2% 
(33.3%) 
37.5% 
(33.3%) 
6.2% 
(11.1%) 
Medium < 
high 
37.5% 
(33.3%) 
43.8% 
(44.4%) 
37.5% 
(33.3%) 
68.8% 
(77.8%) 
High 
6.2% 
(11.1%) 
6.2% 
(0) 
18.8% 
(33.3%) 
6.2% 
(0) 
 
A comparison of the estimates between the three groups shows no significant difference in the 
chosen values (Chi-squared values between 6.97 and 13.80, degrees of freedom=12 and p<0.05). 
However, comparing the values for the two questionnaires, the results for all the participants show 
that there is a significant difference for group A and C and for 2018. Participants of group A tended 
to lower their forecasts, those of group C to increase it. The reason for this difference in the 
reactions will be explored in the following sections. No difference was found in the forecasts of 
2014 or in the estimates of group B. The results for the experienced participants show that there is a 
significant difference between the two questionnaires only for group C for both years. This 
indicates that for group A the difference of the stated forecasts between the questionnaires was 
caused by the non-experienced participants. 
                                                 
* Significant difference between questionnaires 1 and 2 for group A, cost estimate for 2018, all participants, chi-
squared= 3.91, degree of freedom = 1, p<0.05. 
† Significant difference between questionnaires 1 and 2 for group C for all participants for 2018, chi-squared=4.59; for 
experienced participants 2014 chi-squared=7.04, for 2018 chi-squared=6.60; degree of freedom=1, p<0.05. 
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4.2 Confidence levels 
This section discusses the participants’ reactions to the different types of graphical display in the 
context of their confidence level. Figure 3 shows the percentage of participants in each group 
selecting particular confidence levels for their 2014 and 2018 estimates. Again, no significant 
difference was found between the responses from the experienced participants and the others so 
there was no evidence that the experienced users of the graphs were more confident in their 
forecasts than the inexperienced users. In general, it would be expected that the participants would 
be less confident with their 2018 cost estimate than with their estimate for 2014. However, this 
expectation was not confirmed for either of the groups (chi-squared values between 0.19 and 5.18 
for the whole set of participants and between 1.48 and 2.72 for the experienced participants, degrees 
of freedom = 1, p < 0.05). 
 
Figure 3: Confidence levels for each group in comparison 
 
Table 4 depicts the number of participants choosing particular confidence levels in percentage for 
all the participants and for the experienced participants in brackets. 
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Table 4: Confidence levels by group in comparison between whole set and experienced subset of participants 
 Year 2014 2018 
Questionnaire 1 2 1 2 
Group A 
0 - 20% 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
23.1% 
(30.0%) 
23.1% 
(20.0%) 
38.5% 
(20.0%) 
21 - 40% 
23.1% 
(20.0%) 
23.1% 
(30.0%) 
30.8% 
(30.0%) 
23.1% 
(10.0%) 
41 - 50% 
38.5% 
(40.0%) 
38.5% 
(20.0%) 
15.4% 
(20.0%) 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
51 – 60% 
30.8% 
(30.0%) 
15.4% 
(20.0%)) 
23.1% 
(20.0%) 
23.1% 
(20.0%) 
61 – 80% 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
81 – 100% 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
7.7% 
(10.0%) 
0 
(0) 
Group B
*
 
0 - 20% 
6.7% 
(0) 
13.3% 
(8.3%) 
13.3% 
(8.3%) 
20.0% 
(25.0%) 
21 - 40% 
26.7% 
(33.3%) 
33.3% 
(41.7%) 
26.7% 
(33.3%) 
20.0% 
(25.0%) 
41 - 50% 
33.3% 
(33.3%) 
20.0% 
(16.7%) 
20.0% 
(25.0%) 
26.7% 
(25.0%) 
51 – 60% 
0 
(0) 
20.0% 
(16.7%) 
20.0% 
(16.7%) 
13.3% 
(16.7%) 
61 – 80% 
20.0% 
(16.7%) 
6.7% 
(8.3%) 
13.3% 
(8.3%) 
13.3% 
(0) 
81 – 100% 
6.7% 
(8.3%) 
6.7% 
(8.3%) 
0 
(0) 
6.7% 
(8.3%) 
Group C
†
 
0 - 20% 
31.3% 
(33.3%) 
18.8% 
(22.2%) 
50.0% 
(66.7%) 
12.5% 
(11.1%) 
21 - 40% 
31.3% 
(11.1%) 
31.3% 
(22.2%) 
18.8% 
(0) 
37.5% 
(44.4%) 
41 - 50% 
18.8% 
(22.2%) 
18.8% 
(11.1%) 
6.2% 
(0) 
18.8% 
(11.1%) 
51 – 60% 
0 
(0) 
18.8% 
(22.2%) 
12.5% 
(11.1%) 
12.5% 
(11.1%) 
61 – 80% 
18.8% 
(33.3%) 
6.2% 
(11.1%) 
6.2% 
(11.1%) 
12.5% 
(11.1%) 
81 – 100% 
0 
(0) 
6.2% 
(11.1%) 
6.2% 
(11.1%) 
6.2% 
(11.1%) 
 
The introduction of contextual information in questionnaire 2 resulted in a significant change only 
for group C; those participants became more confident. A possible reason can be seen in the fact 
that the most frequently stated confidence levels for group C in questionnaire 1 was 0-20% and thus 
were significantly lower than the ones of groups A and B. A more detailed analysis of the 
participants reasoning will be discussed in Section 4.3. 
                                                 
* Significant difference between questionnaires 1 and 2 for group B in 2014, for all participants chi-squared= 4.92, 
experienced participants chi-squared=4.08, degree of freedom=1, p<0.05. 
† Significant difference between questionnaires 1 and 2 for group C, 2014: all participants chi-squared=5.98, experience 
participants chi-squared=4.87; 2018: all participants chi-squared=5.93, experience participants chi-squared=8.57, 
degree of freedom=1, p<0.05. 
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4.3 Reasoning for estimates 
To understand the rationale used by the participants in providing their estimates, the narrative 
answers were examined closely. The reasons given for their estimates have been categorised as 
follows: lack of information to enable a good estimate to be made, the medium point being judged 
as the most likely to occur, a conservative answer which includes the highest cost estimate or a 
point between medium and high, the subjective interpretations of the future development of the 
world economy, and the existence of uncertainty. Table 5 shows the values per category for all the 
participants with those for the experienced participants in brackets. 
Table 5 Linguistic explanations per category 
 Group A*† Group B‡ Group C§** 
Questionnaire 1 2 1 2 1 2 
more information  
15.4 % 
(20.0%) 
0 
(0) 
20.0% 
(25.0%) 
6.7% 
(10.0%) 
12.5% 
(22.2%) 
0 
(0) 
medium  
38.4% 
(30.0%) 
38.4% 
(30.0%) 
20.0% 
(0) 
20.0% 
(0) 
50.0% 
(33.3%) 
6.2% 
(11.1%) 
conservative  
15.4% 
(20.0%) 
15.4% 
(20.0%) 
33.3% 
(41.7%) 
46.7% 
(58.3%) 
12.5% 
(22.2%) 
12.5% 
(22.2%) 
world economy  
15.4% 
(10.0%) 
46.2% 
(50.0%) 
13.3% 
(16.7%) 
13.3% 
(16.7%) 
18.8% 
(11.1%) 
25.0% 
(11.1%) 
uncertainty  
15.4% 
(20.0%) 
0 
(0) 
13.3% 
(20.0%) 
13.3% 
(16.7%) 
6.3% 
(11.1%) 
75.0% 
(55.6%) 
 
The additional contextual information in questionnaire 2 was found to influence the reasoning of the 
participants of group A and C. Thus, for group B the graphical display had a higher influence on the 
chosen cost forecast than the additional contextual information. The same results were found for the 
experienced participants. 
A comparison of the three groups shows a significant difference between the reasoning of the three 
groups for all participants only for questionnaire 2. This means that the combination of contextual 
information and different graphical displays triggers the decision maker to interpret the given 
information differently. In contrast, for the experienced participants, the only significant difference 
between was found in the comparison of group A and B, questionnaire 2. In other words, the 
knowledge of the experienced decision makers outweighs the influence of the displaying approach. 
Without the contextual information, participants of group A (three point trend graph) and C (fan 
diagram) chose a medium value for their forecast and group B (bar chart) chose a conservative 
value. With the introduction of additional contextual information, participants of group A were 
more likely to state the influence of the world economy on their cost forecast, group B chose a 
conservative forecast and participants of group C to state uncertainty as an important reason for 
                                                 
* Significant difference between questionnaires 1 and 2 for group A, chi-squared =4.00 for all participants and 6.67 for 
experienced participants, degree of freedom=1, p<0.05. 
† Significant difference between groups A and B for questionnaire 2, all participants and experienced participants chi-
squared=9.96, degree of freedom=4, p<0.05. 
‡ Significant difference between groups B and C for questionnaire 2, all participants chi-squared=9.88, degree of 
freedom=4, p<0.05. 
§ Significant difference between questionnaires 1 and 2 for group C, chi-squared =7.59 for all participants and 5.67 for 
experienced participants, degree of freedom=1, p<0.05. 
** Significant difference between groups A and C for questionnaire 2, all participants chi-squared=11.88, degree of 
freedom=4, p<0.05. 
15 
 
their cost estimate. Thus, the fan diagram can be identified as the graphical approach that is most 
likely to trigger the decision maker to recognise the uncertainty inherent in the cost forecast. 
5. Discussion 
The results of this empirical study show the effect that different approaches to displaying 
forecasting information can have on its perception and interpretation. Participants in all groups were 
most likely to choose a cost forecast that was medium or between medium and high. Participants of 
group A were more likely to have a confidence level around 50% and state the medium value as the 
reason for their decision. The additional contextual information caused these decision makers to 
lower their forecast and change their reasoning to that of the influence of the world economy. The 
confidence levels stayed unchanged. For the experienced participants of that group, these values 
were similar to that of the novices; however the additional contextual information had no influence 
on their answers. 
Participants of group B were most likely to choose a confidence level around 40% and state a 
conservative value as the reason for their decision. The additional contextual information produced 
no change for this group. The level of experience had no influence on the participants of that group. 
Participants of group C were most likely to have a confidence level around 20% and state the 
medium value as the reason for their decision. The additional contextual information triggered those 
participants to increase their confidence levels and to identify uncertainty as a main reason for their 
cost forecast. The experienced participants of this group had similar results; however, the additional 
contextual information triggered them to lower their cost forecast. 
The identification of the world economy as a possible influence on the participants’ decision 
(particularly of group A) can be classified as an uncertainty which is outside of the decision maker’s 
control or influence (also described as exogenous uncertainty [89]). Therefore, the three point trend 
forecast prompted the decision makers to include this particular type of exogenous uncertainty in 
their choice. Thus, it can be used as a displaying approach for cost forecasting scenarios which are 
mainly influenced by this type of uncertainty. 
Despite the uncertainty inherent in the given information point estimates were common, even when 
the existence of uncertainty was identified. Most of the participants that stated range estimates were 
experienced in the field (the only exception was observed in group C where one inexperienced 
participant gave a range estimate). This indicates that decision makers tend to simplify their cost 
forecast when including the information in their decision, a finding which is consistent with those of 
earlier studies e.g. Dawes [46] and Simon [90]. Decision makers tend to simplify the level of 
uncertainty from a possible range of future outcomes to a limited set. This is an important point 
especially in the context of inducing decision makers to consider uncertainty in their choices. A 
decision maker in reality is not only limited in the amount of information he/she can ascertain and 
its complexity but also on the level of uncertainty he/she is able to consider. 
Particularly for group C, the additional contextual information triggered the participants to identify 
the uncertainty inherent in the cost forecast. However, drawing the conclusion that more contextual 
information would lead to an enhanced consideration of uncertainty is not applicable as human 
beings are bounded in the amount of information they can perceive and include in their decision 
process [86-88]. Shanteau [91] provides a review of experimental work that focuses on the use of 
given information in the decision process by both experts and non-experts. It was not the aim of this 
paper to identify the optimal amount of information given to a decision maker nor was any such 
conclusion found in the literature. Further research needs to be carried out in this area. 
The potential limitations of this empirical study are connected mainly to the decision making 
environment. Given the fact that the participants of the experiment were drawn out of their usual 
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original organisational and political environment and put into the laboratory environment of the 
workshop, not all the impacts of possible influencing factors can be simulated [81]. Some of the 
motivations to produce a correct estimate may simply not be possible to include in the experiment 
situation. Those motivations can be rewards for an accurate forecast as well as those related to the 
organisational conditions the decision maker works in [81]. As the experiment was carried out in 
the professional environment of a workshop connected with the topic those limitations can be 
accounted as only partly applicable. The participants were experts on the topic of cost forecasting 
and the interpretation of cost forecasts belonged to their professional work. 
6. Conclusions and future research 
Out of the three displays tested, the fan diagram was the most effective in raising awareness of the 
associated uncertainty. The participants presented with the fan diagram were in general less 
confident in their estimates, were more likely to state a range forecast, and identified uncertainty as 
a major factor on the cost estimation outcome. Furthermore, information describing the context 
forms an important aspect to raise the decision maker’s awareness of the uncertainty connected to 
the decision. 
The results of this empirical study have important implications for further research, particularly in 
the area of pricing decisions which are based on the cost forecast. To model the pricing-decision 
process it is important to understand how the decision maker interprets the cost forecast, the context 
of the decision and the uncertainty associated with the project. Furthermore, this decision may be 
influenced by additional uncertainties connected to the pricing environment. The understanding and 
comprehension of uncertainty in this domain is regarded as essential for a successful strategic 
progression of a company particularly within a competitive environment. For this research, a FAN 
diagram is regarded as the most suitable method for displaying uncertain costing information and 
supporting the decision maker’s awareness and interpretation of uncertainty. 
Future research will focus on the uncertainty arising from the existence of competition and its 
influence on the pricing decision. In addition to the empirical work presented in this paper, this will 
give a more elaborate and comprehensive understanding of the decision maker’s reaction to 
different levels and characteristics of uncertainty in a pricing decision problem. This understanding 
should enable practitioners to make better decisions and to price their products and service projects 
more accurately. 
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